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We summarize our recently introduced Projective Consciousness Model (PCM) (Rudrauf
et al., 2017) and relate it to outstanding conceptual issues in the theory of
consciousness. The PCM combines a projective geometrical model of the perspectival
phenomenological structure of the field of consciousness with a variational Free Energy
minimization model of active inference, yielding an account of the cybernetic function
of consciousness, viz., the modulation of the field’s cognitive and affective dynamics
for the effective control of embodied agents. The geometrical and active inference
components are linked via the concept of projective transformation, which is crucial
to understanding how conscious organisms integrate perception, emotion, memory,
reasoning, and perspectival imagination in order to control behavior, enhance resilience,
and optimize preference satisfaction. The PCM makes substantive empirical predictions
and fits well into a (neuro)computationalist framework. It also helps us to account for
aspects of subjective character that are sometimes ignored or conflated: pre-reflective
self-consciousness, the first-person point of view, the sense of minenness or ownership,
and social self-consciousness. We argue that the PCM, though still in development,
offers us the most complete theory to date of what Thomas Metzinger has called
“phenomenal selfhood.”
Keywords: consciousness, first-person perspective, projective geometry, active inference, Free Energy principle,
perspectival imagination, neurophenomenology, cybernetics
INTRODUCTION
Everyone experiences the world from a situated, first-person point of view. We perceptually
sample the world synchronically and diachronically via multiple, spatially distributed sensory
organs, but the multifarious conscious perceptions typically related to the stimulation of these
different sensory organs are all integrated into one coherent experience of one’s ordered spatial
environs, with oneself at the center. And this spatial organization is not simply a matter
of perception: imagination, anticipation, reasoning, action planning and execution, attention
modulation, affective appraisal, and social cognition are all normally experienced as working
in seamless concert with the perspectival space of conscious perception. Can we describe this
integrated, multimodal and “centered” spatial structure of conscious experience in a rigorous way?
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And can we give a good account of why it should be thus
organized? Here we answer both questions in the affirmative.
We maintain that the perspectival organization of
consciousness is a highly non-trivial feature. It is essential to both
the general phenomenological structure of consciousness and the
cybernetic (or “control theoretic”) functional role consciousness
plays for the embodied organism. This dual—phenomenological
and functional—conception of the perspectival structure of
consciousness is the starting point of our recently introduced
Projective Consciousness Model (PCM) (Rudrauf et al., 2017).
The PCM postulates that the mind is a process mediating
active inference supporting navigation in and learning from
the environment in a globally optimal manner (Friston et al.,
2015, 2016; Friston K. et al., 2017). The PCM combines a
model of cognitive and affective dynamics based on variational
and expected Free Energy (FE) minimization with a model
of perspective taking [or a “Field of Consciousness” (FoC)
embedding a point of view] based on 3D projective geometry.
We argue that projective geometry accounts for certain
puzzling features of consciousness that stem from its perspectival
character (e.g., the elusiveness of the point of view, cf.,
Howell, 2010; Williford, 2010; Williford et al., 2012; Renaudie,
2013) and is essential to the full explanation of its key
cognitive-behavioral functions. The concept of 4D projective
transformation is central to the model, as it yields an account
of the link between perception, imagination, and multi-point-of-
view action planning. Overall, the PCM delivers an account of the
phenomenologically available, generic structure of consciousness
and shows how consciousness allows organisms to integrate
multimodal sensory information, memory, and emotion in order
to control behavior, enhance resilience, optimize preference
satisfaction, and minimize predictive error in an efficient manner.
We briefly present our methodology (see the section
“Methodology”), present the PCM (see the section
“Phenomenological Invariants and Functional Features”)
and then discuss some outstanding philosophical issues in
the light of the model (see the section “The ‘Hard Problem’,
Representationalism, and Phenomenal Selfhood”). In this latter
section, we argue that, though metaphysically neutral, the
PCM fits well into a (neuro)computationalist framework, that
it does not fallaciously infer consciousness’ spatial structure
from the conscious representation of space, and that it helps
to distinguish as well as integrate sometimes conflated or
ignored aspects of subjective character, including pre-reflective
self-consciousness, the first-person point of view, the sense of
minenness or ownership, social self-consciousness, and empirical
and “transcendental” egological structures. We suggest that the
PCM offers the most complete theory to date of what Thomas
Metzinger has called “phenomenal selfhood” (Metzinger, 2003;
Blanke and Metzinger, 2009).1
1For readers interested in the model from a psychological and cognitive
neuroscientific point of view and less interested in philosophical problems,
the sections “Methodology” and “Phenomenological Invariants and Functional
Features” can serve as a stand-alone introduction to the PCM. KW is primarily
responsible for the more philosophical the section “The ‘Hard Problem’,
Representationalism, and Phenomenal Selfhood”; anything dubious in it should
not necessarily be held against the other co-authors.
METHODOLOGY
We approach consciousness as a natural phenomenon
that requires a well motivated, parsimonious, generative
(mathematical) model of observable conscious phenomena,
based on general principles and postulates and yielding
empirically testable predictions.
Modeling consciousness first demands a “phenomenology”
of consciousness, a rigorous description of its reflectively
available invariant2 structures. We take this to be part of
the neurophenomenology program (see Varela, 1996; Rudrauf
et al., 2003), which contains the following mutually constraining
components:
(1) Observation and description of the phenomenological
invariants at the appropriate level of abstraction.
(2) Classification of the behavioral, cognitive, and
biofunctional aspects of consciousness.
(3) Identification of the neuroanatomical and
neurophysiological correlates of consciousness.
(4) Development of mathematical and computational
models of consciousness that (a) faithfully integrate all
the invariants described in (1), (b) provide unifying
explanations of and testable hypotheses about the
biofunctional aspects of consciousness described in (2),
and (c) can be physically implemented in the “hardware”
identified in (3), as well as perhaps in non-biological
hardware.
Ideally, this method would give us a theory of consciousness
that intelligibly links the phenomenology of first-person
conscious experience with its realization in the brain (or other
substrate) via a mathematical and computational model and
simultaneously accounts for its biofunctional properties.
The PCM starts from an attempt to formalize
phenomenological features characteristic of consciousness
by describing them in terms of general mathematical principles
and frameworks (viz., projective geometry and FE minimization).
Such principles and frameworks then provide us with strong
constraints for further developing the model in order to
account for specific phenomena (e.g., specific visual illusions,
approach-avoidance behaviors related to imaginary perspective
taking). In other words, the PCM must be seen, above all,
as a model or theory of the generic, invariant structures and
functions of consciousness. Specific experiential or experimental
conditions, combined with the general model, yield specific
predictions. Much work remains regarding the application of
the general model to the variety of such specific conditions for
empirical testing. We have worked out several cases, and are
in the process of testing them further (see examples referred to
below).
2We use the word “invariant” to denote the features of a phenomenon that
remain the same throughout all transformations. The target phenomenon can
itself be intrinsically dynamic (e.g., fluid flows, economic processes, consciousness
itself) and yet exhibit invariances. In physics, these invariances are referred to as
symmetries; these underlie nearly all of physics (e.g., gauge theories like General
Relativity).
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PHENOMENOLOGICAL INVARIANTS
AND FUNCTIONAL FEATURES
Phenomenological Invariants
The following are the deeply interconnected invariants that we
think characterize consciousness.3 We take them as postulates for
mathematical treatment (cf., Oizumi et al., 2014) and construct
the PCM on their basis:
(1) Relational Phenomenal Intentionality: All consciousness
involves the appearance of a world (of objects, properties,
etc.), in various qualitative or representational ways, to an
organism.
(2) Situated 3D Spatiality: The space of the presented world
(objects, etc.) is 3-dimensional and perspectival, unfolding
in an oriented manner between a point of view and a
horizon at infinity (where all parallel lines converge). The
origin of the point of view is elusive, though it normally
seems to be located in the head. The space is normally
organized around the lived body.
(3) Multimodal Synchronic Integration: Consciousness involves
the synthesis or integration into a unified whole of a
multiplicity of qualitative and representational components
(from sensory modalities, memory, and cognition).
(4) Temporal Integration: Consciousness involves at least
the retention of immediately past experiences and the
protention of immediately future experiences, as integral
elements of its “specious present” and a foundation for
more expansive forms of temporal integration (distant
memories, long-term plans, etc.).
(5) Subjective Character: Consciousness involves a pre-
reflective, non-conceptual awareness of itself and its
individuality.
We hold that (2)–(5) are, in fact, all implicated in (1).
Intentionality (1) encompasses four conceptually distinct
but intertwined features: (i) representational content, (ii)
qualitative character, (iii) perspectival character, and (iv)
subjective character. Consciousness seems to involve the
perspectival presentation of something (an object, quality, or
state of affairs) to the conscious system in some specific way
and in a situated context (or “world”). We maintain that all
consciousness is at root relational in its structure in a manner that
is at least proto-spatial and is always framed around a point of
view. This includes the experience of all types of sensory qualities
3There is an extensive, multidisciplinary literature on each of these “invariants”
spanning literally centuries. (Metzinger, 2003 is a fairly comprehensive place to
begin; in relation to the PCM, see Williford et al., 2012 and Rudrauf et al., 2017.)
Note that we assume that these features are invariants; together they constitute a
set of working postulates. There is phenomenological and psychological evidence
for each, but one can find, for each one, someone who has doubted its invariance.
We do not think this matter can be resolved by thought experiment or other
a priori methods, nor do we think it can be resolved by phenomenology or the
interpretation of clinical data. All of these are relevant, but a full resolution will only
come from a conceptually rigorous, empirically successful model. It could turn out
that the PCM characterizes only normal, waking human and animal consciousness
and not all possible consciousness as such. We have larger ambitions but the former
would still be quite significant.
as well as basic affective and mood states and even cognitive
phenomenology.4
Spatiality (2) refers, more specifically, to the fact that the
space of experience is 3-dimensional and perceived (or imagined)
from a situated, first-person point of view centered on the lived
body by default. Spatiality (2) is perhaps most easily noticeable
in visual experience, though careful attention will reveal that it
integrates the vestibular and proprioceptive senses, which are in
fact necessary for the vision-centered localization of the point of
view, as well as all other sensory modalities.
The point of view or origin is elusive, phenomenologically
speaking. It is usually roughly localizable as being behind
the eyes; but in out-of-body experiences (OBEs) and other
types of abnormal consciousness, it can seem to be elsewhere
(Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009) or
strikingly ambiguously located [as in heautoscopy (Sacks, 2012;
Blanke et al., 2016) and some manifestations of schizophrenia
(Fuchs, 2018)]. It is elusive because it does not appear to the
experiencer as a distinguishable object or precisely localizable
point within the phenomenal space.5 Rather, it functions as an
innermost zone around which experience is organized. We see
objects in the distance from here, but we could see them from over
there. If we change our location to be able to see something closer
up or from a different vantage point, the elusive origin moves
with us. The origin of the point of view in our 3D experiential
space is elusive and implicit in the way the origin of 2D planar
perspective drawings and photos is: the point of view is not itself
an object in the photo or drawing, but it is indeed a condition for
the generation and comprehension of the picture (cf., Van Gulick,
2004; Velmans, 2009, 140ff.).
Multimodal Synchronic (3) and Temporal Integration (4) are
similar in that they both involve the fusion or integration
of differences into a whole, unified, coherent episode and,
respectively, sequence of episodes of consciousness. One sees,
4Note that this does not mean that we think that all forms of intentionality
involve a so-called “real relation” between a real object and a subject (e.g., in
thoughts about fictions), but we do hold that there is always a “real relational”
layer in perceptual experience (see Williford, 2013) and that conscious experience
(whatever the modality) does have a spatial structure organized around a point
of view; this includes olfaction, audition, proprioception, mood states, nausea,
and conscious “pure thought”, etc., even though the spatial structure may not be
as obvious for these, at first glance, as it is for vision (see Williford et al., 2012;
Chomanski, 2016; Kapitan, 2016). We cannot fully defend this claim here, but
the basic idea is that all conscious “appearance-of” is “appearance-to” and that
this latter is sufficient for phenomenal spatiality because that to which something
appears is an “zero point” or “origin” in the sense of projective geometry. Thanks
to Tad Zawidzki, Bartolomiej Chomanski, Peter Schulte, Jennifer Windt, and Dan
Zahavi for discussions and debates on this point.
5The elusive origin is not to be confused with, though it bears a certain relation
to, the “cyclopean eye” of von Helmholtz and Hering (see, e.g., Turner, 1994 for
history and Erkelens and Van Ee, 2002 vs. Khokhotva et al., 2005 for a recent
debate). Note that the elusive origin subtends all modalities, not just vision. More
importantly, the cyclopean eye’s origin, which can be precisely located through
optometric measurements, must be inferred “from outside the subject” on the
basis of data involving visuo-motor tasks and need not be assumed accessible
introspectively. It is possible if not likely that the cyclopean eye’s optometric origin
relates to the fact that the origin of the FoC often elusively feels to be behind the
eyes in (especially visual) perception; but the projective model implies that it will
not be precisely located in the space of consciousness as such. There is thus no
contradiction between the optometric concept and the projective model. Thanks
to Björn Merker for discussions on this point.
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hears, smells, feels, thinks about, etc., many qualities and objects
simultaneously as well as diachronically. Among other ways, this
integration manifests spatially by the fact that there is normally
no sense of discontinuity between the boundaries of the visual
field and its multimodal experiential complement all around.
In the temporal domain, one’s current episode of consciousness
is colored by what one has just experienced (retention) and
what one implicitly anticipates (protention) in the immediate
future (see Husserl, 2012). Temporal integration can involve
longer and shorter spans, and we do not pronounce upon what
exactly the minimal span is. We will not treat Multimodal and
Temporal Integration in detail in this article, but we claim that
both diachronic and synchronic integration of information are
framed in consciousness by a perspectivally structured space [and
thus relate essentially to Spatiality (2)].
Subjective Character (5) will be discussed in some detail
in the section “The ‘Hard Problem’, Representationalism, and
Phenomenal Selfhood”, but it should be clear that it relates to
(1) since relationality suggests a subject relatum, to (2) since the
point of view is experienced to be that of the individual conscious
subject, and to (3)–(4) in that synchronic and diachronic
integration seem to center around this same point of view or a
sequence of points of view connected by retention and memory.
The Invariants and Projective Geometry
in the PCM
Here we want to motivate our appeal to projective geometry.
The concrete embodiment of consciousness entails location
and limitation or situatedness, which is a key property in the
derivation of the PCM (Rudrauf et al., 2017). Our bodies can
only occupy one portion of space at a time, and we can never see
an object from all points of view at once. We routinely integrate
perceptions mediated by spatially distributed sense organs, but
we nevertheless have to deal with the surrounding world by
adopting a series of perspectives on it.
Perspectival spatiality is thus, in our view, a general or
determinable feature of every determinate, particular, situated
conscious experience.6 For instance, to experience one’s limbs
as occupying a certain location in space in relation to other
objects in the environment and the rest of one’s body, one must,
in the first place, experience a whole phenomenal space which
subsumes the experienced location of those limbs and their other
possible spatial positions. Moreover, that space must be centered
around an origin in order to define the set of possible locations,
distances, directions, and spatial relations of potential interest
to the situated agent. This perspectival or egocentric frame (cf.,
Campbell, 1994) defines the spatial component of what we call
the FoC. The traditional terminology of a “FoC” (cf., Gurwitsch,
1964) or “phenomenal field” (cf., Bayne, 2010) is quite apt here
in two senses: there is the spatial character of experience, which
is organized like a 3D egocentric vector field (we have a sense of
direction and motion all around us); and consciousness behaves
6This is a bit like the Kantian view that experiential space is an “a priori intuition”;
the difference is that for us the space in question is projective rather than Euclidean
(cf., Friedman, 2012—thanks to Oliver Schliemann for this reference) or hyperbolic
(as in Heelan, 1983—see Rudrauf et al., 2018-preprint for a comparison with
Heelan’s model).
somewhat like a force field attracting attention and driving action
toward objects and locations in 3D, under the influence of an
affective dynamics (see below).
If the FoC is perspectival (has a point of view), it cannot
be Euclidean in its geometrical structure. It therefore must be
conceived of as being different from the surrounding physical
space from the outset. This strongly suggests that it must also
be virtual, in roughly the sense in which the word is used in
“Virtual Reality” (cf., Velmans, 2009, 140ff.; Rudrauf, 2014). Our
intended meaning is perhaps most clearly manifest in phantom-
limb phenomena: one intuitively experiences the phantom limb
as being in a certain location in space; but there is no limb in
the physical location the phenomenal limb is mapped to; hence
the phenomenal bodily space is not the ambient physical space,
even though there is a functional mapping of the former onto the
latter that must be accurate enough most of the time for practical
purposes.
This perspectival space of the FoC is organized around an
elusive, implicit origin or “zero-point” (cf., Merker, 2013; Horgan
and Nichols, 2016; Kapitan, 2016) and includes a horizon with
vanishing points “at infinity” that mark its limit. The FoC embeds
“vectorized” directions that frame the orientation of attention
and action along three axes (vertical, horizontal and sagittal).
These are given in perspective with respect to these same points
at infinity. This is most evident in the case of vision (e.g., think
of converging railroad tracks), but it applies, we believe, to
conscious auditory and tactile spaces (at the very least, they are
normally integrated with the space of vision). It also applies to
imagination, as when we take imagined perspectives on objects
from points of view we do not currently occupy. In the FoC,
objects appear (e.g., visually or audibly) to “grow or shrink”
as they approach or recede, while their size is usually taken
to be constant. Similarly, stable objects are normally taken to
have constant shapes (e.g., a rectangular table) but have variable
apparent shapes (e.g., trapezoidal) depending on the angle of
view.
This perspectival phenomenal space allows us to locate
ourselves and navigate in an ambient space that is nevertheless
essentially Euclidean. However, in Euclidean space, there are
no privileged points, no points at infinity, no horizon, and no
non-arbitrary origin. This very strongly suggests that a non-
Euclidean frame must be operating, with the help of sensorimotor
calibrations, to preserve the sense of the invariance of objects
across the multiple perspectives adopted and relate the situated
organism to the ambient Euclidean space.
Since we are dealing with a 3D perspectival space, with an
(elusive) origin and vanishing points at infinity constituting a
horizon plane, the PCM postulates that the FoC has the structure
of a 3D projective space in the sense of Projective Geometry7. The
FoC can thus be partly understood in terms of a 3D projective
frame.8
7See, e.g., Hilbert and Cohn-Vossen, 1952, Coxeter, 2003, and Richter-Gebert,
2011.
8The notion of a “projective frame” is a technical notion in the PCM that we do
not have space to treat of in detail (see Rudrauf et al., 2017). Briefly, a 3D projective
frame is defined by five points (such that no four are on the same projective plane):
the center O (the “point of view”), three points at infinity (H on the horizon in
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A projective space requires an origin of projection outside of
that space. This is obvious for a projective 2-space as implicated
in drawings “in perspective”, which involve a projection onto
a plane through an origin of projection outside the plane
along a third dimension. It is a fundamental definition of
projective geometry that a projective space of n dimensions
implies an origin of projection outside the n-space, residing
within an n+1 vector space. A related theorem is that any
projective transformation in n dimensions can be interpreted
as a composition of perspectives in a projective space of n+1
dimensions. A projective 3-space thus necessarily involves a
projection onto a 3-space through an origin outside of the space
along a fourth dimension.
The origin of projection cannot appear in the FoC as an object
in the space. Rather, it can only appear elusively, encoded in or
implied by the geometrical structure of the FoC. Nevertheless,
the existence of a fourth dimension is a necessary consequence
of the projective setup. However, it must not be understood
here as an additional physico-spatial dimension but instead as a
parametric dimension in an abstractly describable vector space.
This is unproblematic from a computationalist point of view. In
fact, the necessity of invoking a fourth vector dimension supports
a computationalist account of consciousness (see the section “The
‘Hard Problem’ and Computational Functionalism” below).
A further implication of this model is that all transformations
of points of view, all perspective taking (whether in perception,
imagination, or action programming) must be governed by
changes of frames described by the Projective Linear Group in
four dimensions acting on lines in a 4D vector space, which,
for practical purposes, can be expressed as 4 × 4 transformation
matrices applied to homogeneous coordinates.
We thus must conclude that a particular extension of
three-dimensional space (viz., 3D projective space), which is
independent of (but may incorporate) metrical notions, is
required for generating consciousness. It extends the mostly
unconscious Euclidean geometry used for motion preparation
and execution and underlies the more consciously accessible
geometry used for navigation. 3D projective geometry is the
geometry of points, lines and planes that takes into account only
natural incidence properties. It is the geometry of sheaves of lines
or oriented lines issued from points, and this forms the ground
for experiencing directed actions and motions and for taking
multiple points of view. According to the PCM, this shift to a
projective geometry is necessary for the consciousness.
We will discuss further how the geometrical component
of the PCM relates to other puzzles of phenomenal selfhood
and subjectivity in the final section. Here we emphasize its
connection to perspectival imagination and intersubjectivity (see
also Rudrauf et al., 2017).
Perspectival imagination—being able to know or infer, for
example, how things would look from a different vantage
point—is central to our very “being-in-the-world.” Here, we
front, L laterally, V vertically) and a fifth point, I, in the finite ambient affine 3-
space, which behaves as a control point modulating the spatial scope of information
integration (e.g., when one pays attention to an object “nearby” versus looking out
on a wide-open vista from a high vantage point). See Rudrauf et al. (2017) and
Rudrauf et al. (2018–preprint).
want to emphasize that there is a kind of tacit, “working”
perspectival imagination that configures normal perceptual
experience and reflects a projective geometry. The Husserlian
description of “emptily intending” the unseen parts of physical
objects illustrates the point (see, e.g., Husserl, 1982, 2012).
Empty intending, which is fused with normal perception, is
the basis of our normal anticipations (“protentions”) with
respect to familiar objects. I can, for example, focus my
attention on the location just behind a door, expecting to
see a person as I open it; I can turn a book over to
verify what is on its back cover, tacitly expecting to find a
backside with something on it (words, colors, pictures). We
could not aim beyond the immediately visible and tangible
aspects of the door and could not understand the book as
an 3D object, if we did not have the capacity to (tacitly)
imagine other accessible but currently non-actual points of
view (see Husserl, 2001; Madary, 2016; Williford, 2017). This
sort of working perspectival imagination is constantly operative
in normal perceptual experience and is framed by projective
transformations.9
We can also more explicitly and deliberately imagine what new
vantage points might reveal and routinely do so. We can pass
from a current perspective on an object to “what it would look like
from over there” or what ordinary objects of familiar shape and
size ought to look like as we approach them, recede from them,
or as they (or we) rotate (modulo certain empirical constraints,
see Pizlo, 2008). Importantly, the imagination of objects in space
outside the visual field also respects projective rules (e.g., imagine
an object behind you and move it away, it will appear smaller as
it is farther away and vanish at infinity). Moreover, the group
of projective transformations [PGL(4), for projective 3-space]
contains the group of displacements of rigid objects, and thus a
permanent shift or superposition of transformations enables the
representation of voluntary movements of the body in addition to
the motions of objects.10 This ability for perspective taking, which
echoes voluntary movements in the world (cf., Berthoz, 2000),
is inexplicable without projective geometry; and the affordances
offered in any metric space would be impossible to represent
without a projective geometry.
Importantly, because we routinely truck in actual and possible
vantage points, we come equipped to conceive of vantage points
other than but possibly related to our own (cf., Husserl, 1991,
p. 53). Thus perspectival imagination endows us with one of
the bases for intersubjectivity, which is of obvious biological
import (see, e.g., Humphrey, 2002; Cronin, 2005). Perspectival
imagination and intersubjectivity thus appear grounded by
the group of projective transformations, which fact, in turn,
9The old debate between Neo-Kantians and Phenomenologists about whether what
we call “working perspectival imagination” is really properly considered a kind of
imagination is, on our view, ultimately terminological (see, e.g., several papers in
Summa et al., 2018). Note that this illustrates one specific way in which imagination
and perception are integrated in our normal conscious experience. Deliberative or
counterfactual imagination is integrated with perception in a via negativa manner:
as Sartre (2004a) argued, it is (partly) on the foundation of current perception that
one can intuitively know the difference between the real and the imaginary. See
also Rudrauf et al., 2017 and Figure 4 below.
10See the classic articulation of this problem in Ch. IV of Poincaré’s Science and
Hypothesis in Poincaré, 2001.
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reinforces our confidence that 3D projective geometry is essential
for modeling the structure of consciousness.
To summarize: according to the PCM, the geometrical
structure of multimodal, lived conscious experience closely
approximates a projective 3-space (e.g., RP3) on which projective
transformations [e.g., PGL(4)] act. Our model fits intuitive data,
but it also helps account for other phenomena that might seem
at first unconnected, including working perspectival imagination,
inferences about the points of view and aims of others (modulo
active inference, to be discussed presently), and many other
peculiar phenomena associated with consciousness (e.g., OBEs,
heautoscopy, derealization, “oceanic” mystical experiences, see
Rudrauf et al., 2017 and Figure 1). It also sheds light on previous
accounts of well known visual phenomena, for instance, the
multistable phenomenology of the Necker Cube (see Rudrauf
et al., 2017 and Figure 2), and suggests new accounts of others,
such as the Moon Illusion (cf., Rudrauf et al., 2018-preprint), that
will be the topics of future communications.11
11We do not have space to treat the details of these accounts here (see references in
text). Figures 1, 2 should be revisited after reading the section “Functional Features
of Consciousness.”
FIGURE 1 | Account of psychological phenomena. (A) Projective solution to
VR-mediated dissociations in phenomenal selfhood. The visual field is
indicated (dashed-green line) as a subset of lived space. Left: Projection from
the normal perception spectrum: S1 = T P ◦ R, the projective frame is
calibrated in first-person perception-mode. Right: Third-person projection
from the pure imagination subgroup: S2 = T I ◦ R. Perceptual experiences of
dissociation between the subjective point of view and the sense of location of
the body induced by VR experiments using sensory conflict are explained by
the PCM as the result of a projective solution that is not normally used for
perception but is chosen as the best explanation of sensory data. (B) The
anti-space beyond the plane at infinity. Rendering of the projective space with
a transparent plane at infinity and no clipping, revealing the involution of the
space mirroring the back of the ambient space intrinsic to projective spaces.
(C) The “God’s eye” vantage point on the projective space. Rendering on a
2-dimensional image-plane of the projective space and its mapping of the
world model R from the “God’s eye” point of view at infinity. Almost all the
space is visible but completely warped and the world model manifests as
structures with complex symmetries (from Rudrauf et al., 2017, used by
permission from Elsevier).
FIGURE 2 | Projective solutions to the Necker cube. Projection of two
complementary views S1 and S2 of a generic wireframe cube R in a projective
space (rendered on an image plane). (Left) When the implicit point of view is
placed far away and the projective frame has a narrow scope, no perspective
information remains to disambiguate the orientation of the cube. Free Energy
(FE) does not possess a unique minimum, each option is unsatisfying, the
inference is globally undecidable but irrepressible, and the system can oscillate
between the two possible outcomes. (Right) When the implicit point of view is
located near the projected cube in ambient space, perspective information
helps to disambiguate the inference about the two possible orientations of the
cube, T1 and T2 (see gray ellipses indicating the front). As a result, FE always
possesses a minimum for a unique transformation T and perception can
stabilize (from Rudrauf et al., 2017, used by permission from Elsevier).
According to the PCM, to fully understand the
phenomenology and functions of consciousness, one must
also consider how projective geometry is the support of a general
process of active inference (Friston et al., 2016; Rudrauf et al.,
2017; Wiese and Metzinger, 2017), which entails approximate
Bayesian inference under the FE principle (Friston, 2010). This
is the second, central component of the PCM that we shall
now discuss in relation to the functional or “cybernetic” role of
consciousness.
Functional Features of Consciousness
We claim that the overall function of consciousness is to
address a general “cybernetic” problem or problem of control.
Consciousness enables a situated organism with multiple
sensory channels to navigate its environment and satisfy
its biological (and derived) needs efficiently. This entails
minimizing predictively erroneous representations of the world
and maximizing preference satisfaction. A good model of
consciousness must be able to explain how this is accomplished.
The PCM thus emphasizes the following interrelated functional
features of consciousness:12
(1) Global Optimization and Resilience: Consciousness helps
the organism reliably find the globally optimal solutions
available to it given its competing preferences, knowledge
base, capacities, and context, making the organism more
resilient. This is a mechanism of global “subjective” (here
in roughly the sense of “subjective Bayesian”) optimization,
which does not always entail “objective” optimality, though
it must approximate the latter reliably enough (cf., Lewis,
1980).
(2) Global Availability: The contents of consciousness must be
generally globally available (Baars, 1993, 1997; Dehaene,
2014) in the sense of “poised” to be treated of (cf., Tye, 1995)
12The literature on each item is, again, multidisciplinary and massive. See Rudrauf
et al. (2017) for references relevant to the PCM.
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by our affective, cognitive, and perceptual systems as the
occasion requires.
(3) Motivation of Action and Modulation of Attention:
Consciousness is generally implicated in the motivation
of action based on affective dynamics and memory (see
Rudrauf and Debbané, 2018); this drives the modulation
of attention (though consciousness is not to be narrowly
identified with attention, cf., e.g., Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007
and Kentridge, 2011).13
(4) Simulation Enhancement: Consciousness facilitates the use
of simulation (in the broad sense of “imagination” not
the narrow sense of “simulation theory”) in the service of
solving cognitive, perceptual, and affective problems, and
more generally in the anticipation and programming of
actions and the response to their outcomes.
It should be clear that, here again, these items are interrelated.
Items (2)–(4) are, in fact, all either necessary for or highly
conducive to item (1). Information that is not globally available
cannot be dealt with using the full range of our capacities. If a
person is unable to keep attention trained on salient objects in
the environment, he or she will, at best, have difficulties properly
navigating it and becoming familiar with the objects —this relates
Global Availability (2) to Motivation and Attention (3). If an
agent cannot simulate alternatives, then a whole range of possible
solutions to problems becomes inaccessible, and they can become
locked into brute-force, infantile, escapist or last-resort strategies,
with severe psychopathological consequences and symptoms (cf.,
e.g., Fuchs, 2018)—this relates Simulation (4) to Motivation and
Attention (3).14
Having a consciousness that incorporates a virtual,
transformable projective space is a highly efficient way for
an organism to keep track of its own location and orient itself
in a multiplicity of real spaces—social spaces and time included.
Likewise, projective geometry is necessary for an organism
to be able to frame 3D perspectival salience maps, which are
essential to the modulation of attention, appraisal, motivation,
and orientation (see Rudrauf and Debbané, 2018). Conversely,
the advantages and flexibility afforded by a projective geometrical
framing would remain dormant were it not coupled with an
appraisal engine capable of motivating behaviors based on the
FoC.
The PCM and the Functional
Features—Active Inference and FE
Minimization
The PCM combines projective geometry with an algorithm
based on the principles of active inference (which embeds
perceptual inference) driven by FE minimization in order to
account for fundamental features of perceptual intentionality,
13See Prinz (2012) for the dissenting view on this; his identification of attention
with availability to working memory (pp. 90ff) suggests that his theory is based on
what we regard as but one functional feature of consciousness (Global Availability)
that is indeed central; perhaps some of the debate is just terminological. Thanks to
Ali Yasar for discussion on this point.
14We shall further demonstrate this in future reports (cf., Rudrauf and Debbané,
2018).
object identification, and action guidance, based on cognitive
and affective priors (Rudrauf et al., 2017; Rudrauf and Debbané,
2018, see also Friston, 2010; Frith, 2013; Hohwy, 2013; Clark,
2015; Metzinger and Wiese, 2017; Wiese and Metzinger, 2017).
We choose to use FE minimization as the functional metric for
optimization, since it has a solid conceptual history, and offers
powerful solutions to the general problem of active inference for
embodied agents in an approximate Bayesian framework (Friston
K. et al., 2017).
Active inference is a method of information processing and
control by which an autonomous system or agent (i) anticipates
the consequences of its actions by predicting how they will
affect the system perceptually, (ii) programs its actions and acts
accordingly (given preferences), and (iii) (Bayesian) updates its
prior beliefs based on a comparison between its predictions and
sensory evidence in order to minimize predictive error.
Free Energy is a quantity transposed into Bayesian learning
theory from statistical physics. It yields a functional for
controlling mechanisms of predictive coding, directly applicable
to active inference. The quantity can be expressed in different
ways and can encode prior beliefs and preferences related to
appraisal and behavioral policies and to past, present, and future
expected states following actual or anticipated actions (Rudrauf
and Debbané, 2018). Generally speaking, it can be formulated as
the sum of two terms: (i) the the expectation of the difference
between the logarithm of the probability of the prediction under
a generative model encoding prior beliefs and preferences and
the logarithm of the probability of the sensory outcome, and (ii)
the departure of posterior beliefs from prior beliefs expressible by
the Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD) (see, e.g., Friston, 2010;
Friston K. et al., 2017; Wiese and Metzinger, 2017).
The FE principle entails that agents attempt to minimize their
overall FE in order to maximize the accuracy of their beliefs and
the satisfaction of their preferences in a globally optimal (or “all
things considered”) manner. Formally, FE is an upper bound
on “surprise”, which is key to assessing the predictive value of
internal generative models of the causes of sensations. Note that
the KLD in FE as expressed above can be developed into two
terms: an expectation and a negentropy. When formulated that
way, the form of FE appears closer to the form it takes in physics
and better manifests its nature.15
An essential addition of the PCM to this paradigm is the
framing of variational FE through the FoC. In the PCM, FE is
a function of the action of projective transformations on the
FoC so that the states (probabilities) and the weights defining
FE depend on the choice of a projective frame F, which relates
to where and how we look or aim at our surroundings (see
Rudrauf et al., 2018-preprint). This applies to perception, recall,
and imagination, which, notably, is used in evaluating anticipated
actions through expected FE. The minimization of FE thus
becomes a function of the FoC, that is, of consciousness. Thus
consciousness becomes an integral part of a global optimization
process for cybernetic control. What the PCM adds to all
15This formulation features an explicit quantity of information to be maximized
expressed as an entropy and emphasizes the fact that the logarithm of prior
probabilities behaves like a microscopic energy that becomes internal energy when
summed on the posterior law.
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the approaches in the predictive coding, active inference and
Bayesian Brain paradigms (see, e.g., Wiese and Metzinger,
2017) is this crucial geometrical component, yielding a psycho-
functional model that is independent of the specific brain
implementation.16
Projective Consciousness Model agents optimize the precision
of their knowledge about the causes of their sensations and
the satisfaction of their preferences based on the FoC, which
frames the distribution of FE attached to objects and affordances
across space and time, factually or by anticipation. Cycles of
perception, imagination, and action, as well as prior updates
are used to minimize FE as projectively framed. The agents
combine perspective taking based on projective transformations
and attributions of prior beliefs and sensory evidence (to
themselves or other agents as the case may be) within a FoC
in order to appraise the optimality of possible actions given
a set of preferences. Because FE bounds surprise, expected FE
places an upper bound on uncertainty. This follows because,
mathematically, surprise is self-information, and expected self-
information is entropy (i.e., uncertainty). In other words, the
actions we anticipate are those that will resolve the greatest
uncertainty. Note, however, that PCM agents simultaneously try
to maximize preference satisfaction along a variety of dimensions
of appraisal through FE minimization. Thus highly certain
negative outcomes can be associated with a higher level of FE
than some uncertain outcomes with possible positive results (cf.,
Rudrauf and Debbané, 2018).
To illustrate, in the PCM, your immediate conscious
experience that seems to you to be the visual presentation of, for
instance, a puppy curled up by the fire is the projective framing
of your brain’s pre-personal, non-conscious, neurocomputational
“best guess” as to what is causally responsible for your current
and just passed sensory data in a given context and relative to
certain priors (of varying flexibility) that constrain and bias your
perception (cf., Merker, 2012).
Moreover, the consciously accessible “result” of these
neurocomputational processes carries with it (partly consciously
accessible) perspectivally framed predictions (“working
imagination”) about the sensory data (and corresponding
object perceptions) you are most likely to continue having or
would have were you to take certain actions, thus serving as
a support for further active inference. In this way, one does
not end up only with a “God’s eye point-of-view” Euclidean
map of the objects in ambient space, but something more like a
“user surface” (Metzinger, 2003) that encodes all the projectively
articulated structures we are so familiar with (e.g., the puppy
seen from here versus there, partially occluded by the table, or
seeing one coming toward it).
Active vision thus becomes like a “palpation” of a 3D
spatial “user surface” to “feel” the epistemic affordances that
are quantified by expected FE. This anticipatory palpation with
16This is why we do not frame the paper primarily in reference to known
or suspected neurological structure-function relations (e.g., the dual stream
hypothesis of Goodale et al., 1991 and Milner and Goodale, 2008; thanks to Björn
Merker on this point). In Rudrauf et al., 2017, we do make some general hypotheses
about neurological structure–function relationships and note that the PCM is
certainly consistent with what is known about such relations.
temporal depth requires a generative model that encompasses
the consequences of actions and their affective values. This
requires executive functions such as working memory, the
modulation of attention, deployment of cognitive resources,
and affective appraisal dynamics that altogether enable us to
minimize FE over alternative sequences of actions as necessary
for maximizing expected values (see Friston K.J. et al., 2017;
Rudrauf et al., 2017). The framing of expected FE through
projective transformations in imagination provides a method
for envisioning “how things would look, feel, be [etc.] from
another, hopefully better, location”, and thus guide action. It
is important to emphasize that according to the PCM, FE
minimization is always operating as the fundamental algorithm
governing the FoC, and thus there is never an end to
the process, as there is never in practice a solution that
reduces FE to zero. Hegel might be happy to know that on
the PCM consciousness is thus always somehow “unhappy”
even when it reaches the best possible states available to
it.
The PCM also embeds a distinction between the FoC and
what we call the “world model” (R). The world model is a
generally unconscious (or “preconscious”) but accessible model
stored in memory and included in the agent’s prior beliefs
and generative models. It contains models of objects and
relationships in the ambient Euclidean space across time and
is continually updated on the basis of the agent’s history of
perspective taking through a process analogous to multi-view
reconstruction, based on reverse active inference and (epipolar)
projective geometry (see Rudrauf et al., 2017). The current
FoC accesses and contributes to updating the world model
dynamically in a situated, perspectival manner (see Rudrauf
et al., 2017). For example, when we consider a building or
any structure in space, we not only perceive it in perspective,
but also have a sense of it being a Euclidean object existing
in independence of any particular point of view on it. This
is accounted for by the combination of active inference and
projective geometry and their role in building a world model.
Thus, according to the PCM, it is projective geometry that
optimally enables both the perspectival accessing of Euclidean
models of the world in memory for appraisal and the updating
of such models through active sampling so that one can build a
(relatively) perspective-independent (objective) knowledge base.
Projective geometry helps functionally connect subjectivity and
epistemic objectivity allowing us to see consciousness as a kind of
mediator between the situated organism and the objective world
it inhabits.
To summarize: according to the PCM, each episode of
consciousness is a computationally virtual and phenomenal
space that approximates a 3D projective space (e.g., RP3). It is
populated with representational content including affordances
for the motivation of action at any given time in the
manner described by the principles of active inference and FE
minimization. These are the contents that are made “globally
available” and thus are poised to be treated of by, in principle,
all cognitive, affective, and perceptual modalities. Attentional
modulation, affective responses and strategies, the deployment of
cognitive resources, and the direction of behavior by working and
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deliberative projective imagination are all guided by the overall
directive of global FE minimization (less technically, we generally
prefer to be in or imagine pleasant and safe situations). The
PCM thus hypothesizes that conscious brains should realize a
projective geometrical rendering engine embedded in a general
active inference engine, which in turn is presided over by a
global FE minimization algorithm (Rudrauf et al., 2017) (see
Figures 3, 4).
We note that unconscious activities have a broader scope that
we cannot treat of here. Conscious and preconscious phenomena
are indeed the tip of an iceberg, and we do not claim that
the entire iceberg can be explained in these terms. Moreover,
the inner geometry behind the 3D projective framing of the
FoC is certainly much more complex, involving many variables
that are difficult to describe precisely at present. What we say
here applies primarily to consciousness, self-consciousness, and
closely related preconscious dynamics.
Finally, we must emphasize that, as a scientific model, the
PCM yields specific empirical predictions, in addition to offering
a general explanatory framework that encompasses several well-
known puzzling phenomena (see Figures 1, 2). The derivations
of specific predictions from the general principles can be quite
demanding mathematically (see, e.g., Rudrauf et al., 2018-
preprint). Nevertheless, the PCM has been developed to make
quantitative predictions about specific perceptual, affective, and
behavioral phenomena. It makes quantitative predictions about
perceptual size distortions that can be tested in virtual reality
(VR) (e.g., the Moon Illusion and Sky-Dome Illusion, see Rudrauf
et al., 2018-preprint). It also makes quantitative predictions
about the role of projective imagination in enhancing behavioral
flexibility, emotion-regulation, and resilience in relation to goal-
directed behaviors. PCM agent simulations predict internal
cognitive and affective states (which could be assessed with
self-reports and performance metrics) as well as approach-
avoidance behaviors, and more generally navigation in space
(which could be linked to empirical data based on motion
tracking) (cf., Figure 3’s simulations of a virtual pit challenge).
Such predictions can be tested using VR, and we are currently
implementing VR paradigms to do so. We note that the PCM
also suggests a general framework for conceptualizing a range
of psychopathological disorders and predicting their attendant
mental states and behaviors (see Rudrauf and Debbané, 2018).
FIGURE 3 | Simplified 2D PCM-based simulation of a pit challenge. (Left Tier) Maps of a 2D world model and agent with a departure room (left: safe and
anhedonic) a challenge room with a pit (center: unsafe and unpleasant), a goal room (right: safe and pleasant) (see color code). Sensory evidence maps represent
factual observations, prior beliefs maps, the beliefs of the agents, and large white circles their FoC. One simulated agent is more likely to imagine remote options
(stronger imagination) than the other (weaker imagination). T1 to T4 stand for time periods. Circular FoC maps show ongoing perceived (local) and transiently
imagined (remote) situations; colors index Free Energy (FE, see color bar). (Right Tier, Top) General PCM architecture: a projective geometry engine is controlled by
a FE-driven active inference engine. (Middle) Time courses of FE. Optimal FoC perspectives have lowest FE (green line) compared to average of other possible
perspectives (red line). (Bottom) Cumulative frequencies of agents’ appraisals across time and belief accuracy. A stronger imagination leads agents to cross the pit
after hesitating and reach the goal room, maximizing utility, as goal-related, optimistic projective imagination reduces overall FE near the pit. As a result, there is a
gain in pleasure or resilience versus initial conditions (red arrow), and exploration with prior updating increases accuracy. A lower imagination leads agents not to
explore the environment, never enjoy a better condition or greater accuracy, and to repetitively wander locally. (See Rudrauf and Debbané, 2018 for more details on
this particular family of simulations.)
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FIGURE 4 | Overall sketch of the PCM. Lived space S (represented by blue
spheres): subjective experience of space and its contents as perceived
(continuous funnels on the figure) or imagined (dashed funnels), framed in a
3-dimensional projective representation in perspective of a world model R(X, t)
associated with a distribution of Free Energy (FE), related to cognitive and
affective personal preferences (colors on the manikins and door, and disk with
color gradient). Perspective taking and the selection of corresponding
projective transformations T are constrained by the gradient of FE across
space δFE. The diagram with the arrows in a circle represents the possible
transitions of state affecting the FoC: form perception to imagination and
action. The FoC is partially driven by sensory evidence when it is focused on
perception of the local environment and entirely driven by prior beliefs in
memory and simulation capabilities when it is focused on imagination of
non-local spaces (e.g., when we imagine ourselves at home while we are at
work). FE minimization defines the optimal perspective at a given instant. FE is
globally minimized through cycles of perception, imagination, and action
across time. The bar graph represents FE as a function of time and of the
different perspectives and processing modes [P—perception versus
I—(non-local) imagination] adopted by the system (see text and Rudrauf et al.,
2017; image from Rudrauf et al., 2017, used by permission from Elsevier).
THE “HARD PROBLEM”,
REPRESENTATIONALISM, AND
PHENOMENAL SELFHOOD
We turn finally to some philosophical issues that still
preoccupy theorists of consciousness: the “Hard Problem”,
representationalism, and the problems of subjective character or
phenomenal selfhood. We discuss these in relation to the PCM.
The “Hard Problem” and Computational
Functionalism
We agree with Varela that the neurophenomenological approach
(outlined in the section “Methodology” above), provides, in a
certain sense, a “methodological remedy” for the “Hard Problem”
of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996; Varela, 1996; Rudrauf et al.,
2003). In our view, the method offers the best that “positive”
science can do with regard to the problem of consciousness. In
various guises, it has become more accepted in neuroscience (see,
e.g., Oizumi et al., 2014), and it is perfectly in accordance with the
quest for generative models (see, e.g., Petitot et al., 1999) such as
the PCM; such models suggest ways to “axiomatize” the theory of
consciousness, and thus go beyond mere correlations.
Neurophenomenology shares with classical Husserlian
Phenomenology a bracketing of metaphysical positions, which
are not decidable by phenomenological means. The metaphysics
of consciousness cannot be decided by mere conceivability
considerations either, since what is conceivable with respect
to consciousness is constrained only by phenomenologically
available, intuitive invariants. Its scope is correspondingly
widened by what is phenomenologically unavailable; and it is
fallacious to infer a property’s inapplicability to consciousness
from its introspective unavailability (see, e.g., Williford,
2007; Elpidorou, 2016). This undermines the claim that
phenomenology can determine the full metaphysical possibility
space with respect to consciousness and explains how so many
incompatible metaphysical positions could all seem equally
conceivable. Thus framed, neurophenomenology is compatible,
strictly speaking, with dualisms, panpsychisms, non-reductive
physicalisms, and even with idealisms. It is thus also compatible
with computational functionalism, a view that fits well with the
PCM and is also independently motivated.
The PCM’s two main components can be fully described
and implemented computationally or simulated (Rudrauf et al.,
2017). In fact, on the assumption that the brain is an object in
Euclidean-approximate 3-space, we must regard the PCM as a
computational model, since its fourth dimension must then be
a vector dimension computed algebraically with homogeneous
coordinates. The PCM implies that the FoC relies on the
straightforward computation of a four-dimensional structure
that has no (non-computational) correlate in three-dimensional,
ambient physical space. Does this mean that all simulated PCM
agents are conscious entities?
In line with a computationalist version of a posteriori
identity theory, we can consistently maintain that all instances
of consciousness fit the PCM but that not all simulations
of the PCM constitute a real consciousness.17 It is perfectly
consistent and not particularly ad hoc to maintain that these
simulations lack the necessary scale and organized complexity
required for consciousness. If so, then it is not enough to
create an artificial consciousness merely to implement the
PCM in the truncated and highly abstract way required
by practical simulations. But a system “running” the PCM
that would more closely approximate the actual complexity,
organization, and processing power of human or animal
brains very well could, on our view, literally be an artificial
consciousness.
This claim will no doubt bring to mind all the classic
objections to computational functionalism (e.g., Block,
1978; Putnam, 1988; Searle, 1992; Buechner, 2008). But
the phenomenological undecidability of the metaphysics
of consciousness has an important implication here. In
17By “computationalist a posteriori identity theory” we mean the view that (1)
all instances of consciousness are token-identical to physically realized instances
of possible phases in a generically identical computational process (program,
software) C, and that (2) both C and the constraints on the realization of C (e.g.,
information processing speed, memory capacity) in a given substrate (hardware)
must be determined a posteriori.
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particular, it implies that our identity hypotheses about
consciousness will involve the appearance of contingency in
an ineliminable way.18 The force of many of the objections
to computational functionalism turns precisely on this
appearance of contingency. But once one accepts that the
metaphysics of consciousness cannot be decided a priori or
by appeal to phenomenology alone, one is no longer bothered
by these apparently contingent elements that are knowable
only a posteriori. This kernel of apparent contingency in
the theory of consciousness can be rendered more palatable
by proper reflection on structural features described in the
computational model and the relations these features bear
to phenomenological structures as well as to functional
constraints. [One should also remember that even in pure
mathematics there is the irremediable appearance of contingency
(cf., Chaitin, 2003)]. One can thus think of this position
as a combination of what is right about the functionalist
tradition in philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence, and
cognitive psychology with what is right about phenomenological
realism.
Computationalist a posteriori identity theory allows that
apparently contingent processing constraints may be essential
to real consciousness. As long as the computational model
captures the phenomenological invariants, meets the functional
constraints, and survives the tribunal of prediction and
experiment, we should happily accept that some apparently
contingent and only empirically knowable constraints pertaining
to the physical realization of consciousness are actually essential
to it.19
The brain does indeed seem to be a kind of biological
computer, among the other things it is (see Rudrauf, 2014).
Barring the “wonder tissue” view of the brain (cf., Dennett, 2013)
or some form of panpsychism, it is not at all implausible that it is
(neuro)computational organization that principally differentiates
consciousness from other brain processes. Moreover, it is not
unreasonable to be an objective realist about such computation.
In some way, the causal-informational organization of the
brain allows it to really implement computations (i.e., realize
the computation of certain functions objectively and in
independence from the interpretations of observers). As long
as one is realist enough about (approximate) mathematical
structure in the world (and one should be, if one accepts
physical laws as an apt summary of the world we live in), then
accepting that brains (or computers, for that matter) really realize
determinate computations ought not to be too large a pill to
swallow.20
18Indeed, this appearance of contingency will apply to any ontology of
consciousness that is not vacuous (e.g., non-vacuous versions of substance dualism,
idealism, or panpsychism). To think otherwise is to think that it is possible to
know a priori that some substantive ontological theory is necessarily true of
consciousness. But no mere mortal seems to be able to know this, even if a God
could—which, evidently, does not help us in any case. (See, e.g., Williford, 2004,
2007, cf., Wilson, 2014.)
19Something similar can be said vis-à-vis the problem of “qualia” (see Williford,
2013, 2015).
20We accept a modest applied mathematical realism bearing well in mind the
reasonable limitations and caveats that must inform such a position. For important
and illuminating discussion, see Wilson (2006).
One may, of course, wonder further about the biophysics of
brain computation, the brain’s “native coding language” so to
speak, and, in particular, how the “real unity” of consciousness
is achieved in this matrix. We have hypothesized elsewhere
that the latter is achieved through a process that is equivalent
to virtualization in computer science (see Rudrauf, 2014). And
here we can reasonably expect that the general lesson of
organismic biology is respected: preservation of form through
the flux of matter. Form or structure requires material for its
realization. In virtue of realizing that form, it gains certain causal
powers (cf., Hofstadter, 2007), even the ability to reproduce
the relevant form. We may not yet know in full detail how
real, determinate computation is implemented in the brain, but
there is little doubt that it is. Indeed, if one subscribes to the
FE principle, some quantity is being optimized or computed
through biophysical (neuronal) dynamics. And identifying
consciousness with the realization of a certain computational
structure poses, in principle, no further metaphysical conundrum
in this regard. One might even reasonably suggest that conscious
processing just is the relevant inferential processing (described
here by the PCM) entailed by neuronal (and other) dynamics.
The old notion (cf., Fodor, 1981) that functionalism (modulo
phenomenological undecidability) provides the best solution to
the Mind-Body Problem is still worth taking very seriously.
It is certainly not more reasonable to take consciousness to
be a fundamental, non-structural feature of reality. So far
there have been no theoretical gains, measured by parsimony
considerations in any case, derived from the recently passed
vogue of neo-dualisms, nor from the current surprising (but also
surely ephemeral) vogue of panpsychism and related views in
analytical philosophy of mind (see, e.g., Brüntrup and Jaskolla,
2016).
We do not deny that the realization of consciousness may
involve non-computational factors, even if, as we suggest,
it involves some computational factors essentially. Again, we
face the old problem of the iceberg here: consciousness is
subtended by the unconscious, and our knowledge of the nature
of the latter’s computations is limited. There are also issues
surrounding continuity and discreteness: digital machines are
thought of as discrete entities, but this a bad approximation
of what happens in cells and in the physical world generally.
We are embedded in the world, a reservoir of multiscalar
complexity, which contains permanent, non-stationary motions
and non-equilibrium states, including our own movements.
We are in many aspects homogeneous with this world, which
is not necessarily the case for computation as we currently
tend to model it, even when many parameters are included.
We are also confronted with difficult problems concerning
the relations between energy and information. Moreover, as
indicated above, a much wider kind of internal geometry
underlies the Euclidean and projective geometries involved in
action and consciousness; this internal geometry is made for
action integration and thus takes into account energy and our
physical interactions with the external world. We must simply
accept that our understanding of the structure of computation,
in relation to embedded geometries in the brain, is still very
limited.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 December 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2571
fpsyg-09-02571 December 13, 2018 Time: 15:24 # 12
Williford et al. Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood
The PCM and Representationalism
We want to forestall a worry that some representationalists
might have about the way we have formulated the PCM.21 They
might worry that we have committed a higher-order version of
the “sense datum fallacy” (Prichard, 1938). According to that
“fallacy”, one cannot infer from the appearance of, say, an orange-
ish afterimage that there exists something that appears and is
orange-ish. In fact, we are sympathetic with the Husserlian view
that there exists something like sensory hyle so that, qualified the
right sort of way, this inference is not fallacious (see Williford,
2013). But, indeed, to think of a unicorn does not imply that
there exists a unicorn (of which one thinks); this is conceptual
thought, however, not perception. Perception includes levels that
are beneath the level of conceptual representation; and couched
at some such “lower” level, the relevant de re quantification
need not be illicit. Further, representationalists who want to
identify phenomenal content with non-conceptual, intentional
content have at the least to accept that there is some vehicular
correlate of that non-conceptual content that one is indirectly
but phenomenally aware of in having the content at all.
Otherwise they cannot plausibly say what the difference is
between two phenomenally conscious perception tokens that,
by their hypothesis, must be aimed at non-existent property
instances (cf., Hall, 2007; Thompson, 2008; Papineau, 2016).
Thus, again, in a certain sense, we do not think the “sense
datum fallacy” is actually a fallacy. Moreover, one can formulate
a sort of representationalism, one that denies a strong form of
its “transparency” thesis (cf., Kind, 2003), that converges with a
more Husserlian model (see Williford, 2013, 2015).
However, one might yet object that we are making the
following dubious inference: Consciousness represents space
(and objects in it) in a projective manner; therefore, it is (or
really approximates) a projective space. And here we would say
roughly the same thing we say about sensory hyle or vehicles
(Williford, 2013): at the very least the projective frame is a
vehicular, structural property of consciousness. As such, in being
aware of it, we are aware of properties of consciousness, not
merely properties that consciousness represents.
Further, recall that essential properties of projective spaces are
conspicuously missing from the Euclidean ambient space that we
navigate via consciousness; the latter has no privileged origin,
no points at infinity where parallels converge, etc. We can thus
only make good sense of certain well known facts of perception
(detailed above) on the assumption of a projective perceptual
geometry. Representationalists, exhibiting some awareness of
this issue, sometimes try to build these properties into first-
order perceptual representations of physical objects [see, e.g.,
Tye, 2002 (in response to Peacocke, 1983, 1993); Van Cleve,
2002]. If this response is not a roundabout admission of defeat,
it seems to border on the absurd, since it implies that we
routinely misrepresent first-person experiential observer-object
21We should disclose here our general sympathy with the internalist, indirect realist
orientation of many people working in the active inference, predictive coding, and
Bayesian Brain paradigms (see, e.g., Anderson, 2017; Clark, 2017; Hohwy, 2017
for interesting recent discussion and Metzinger, 2003; Revonsuo, 2009 for more
general arguments in favor of this orientation; see also Windt, 2018 for related food
for thought).
pairs as being entirely Euclidean and as having properties that
only projective spaces have.22 It seems more elegant to make the
projective structure into a general “vehicular” or “frame” property
of consciousness into which various contents can be fitted, so to
speak, and not to try to make these projective properties into
covert properties of the objects represented.
We thus find our inference from projectively structured
conscious experience of the world to a projective structure of
consciousness itself not fallacious at all given the implausibility of
the alternatives. Assuming that consciousness has this structure
explains more—and more elegantly—than the competing
representationalist hypotheses.
The PCM, Subjective Character, and
Phenomenal Selfhood
Subjectivity is given to us as a unified phenomenon. It is by
reflection, analysis, and sometimes observation of clinical and
psychopharmacological phenomena, that we learn to disentangle
its many strands. Most salient for our purposes here are these
elements: (i) the first-person point of view, (ii) pre-reflective
self-consciousness, (iii) global self-consciousness, (iv) social self-
awareness, (v) ipseity or “mineness” (foundational to the sense
of body ownership and agency), (vi) the “transcendental ego”,
(vii) the autobiographical self or “empirical ego.”23 We say a word
about how the PCM relates and unifies many of these aspects of
phenomenal selfhood.
The PCM begins with the situatedness of the conscious
organism and the perspectival nature of experience. What we
see from a given location at a given time; and we must multiply
points of view on an object over time to extract a more
absolute or objective conception of the object’s transphenomenal
structure (which, again, is exactly what multi-view reconstruction
algorithms are optimal for). This is encoded in the PCM in
terms of the projective structure of the FoC. Further, the elusive
“lived origin”, as we indicated above, must in fact arise from
an inaccessible higher vectorial dimension. This elusiveness may
seem to suggest a “viewer” or hidden “transcendental ego” and
thus makes a certain “homuncularism” somewhat seductive. But
this is just a structural feature of the conscious space.24 The origin
cannot be experienced as a perceptual object. In that sense, it
could never look at itself or catch its tail. In fact, there is no
“thing” here that could “look at itself ”, but rather a virtual pivotal
22It is not absurd for being an “error theory” but rather for the specific
content of the error. See Hill, 2009, 156ff for a different, more plausible sort of
representationalist response to this problem. Hill argues that we are normally just
inattentionally blind to these projective properties of awareness.
23The literature on these elements and their relationships is, of course, immense,
multidisciplinary, and spans centuries (see, e.g., Zahavi, 1999, 2008; Metzinger,
2000, 2003; Frank, 2007, 2016; Kriegel, 2009; Williford et al., 2012; Zahavi and
Kriegel, 2016; Billon, 2017; Guillot, 2017; Howell and Thompson, 2017).
24The elusive origin of the perspective and the whole space for consciousness,
are unified in projective geometry as follows: the projective group immanent
in changes of frame are bijective one-to-one transformations of RP3, but the
projectivities corresponding to perspectives, come from non-bijective 4D linear
transformations. The latter have a kernel, the set of vectors that go to zero; on this
kernel the transformations of lines have no sense. This kernel yields the elusive
origin of the projectivity, but from one plane to another the map is well defined.
Thus the unification of these two kinds of transformations is achieved by 4 × 4
matrices.
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point essential for the rendering of lived space, and necessary
for establishing a direction of aim or “vectorization” of the
FoC. It is not a detachable entity looking at an object. The real
“transcendental ego”, so to speak, is not an ego at all. It is rather
the unconscious computational machinery of the brain that is
the generative mechanism of consciousness as a whole. The PCM
thus gives a unified account of features (i) and (vi) above.
In addition to emphasizing the perspectival character of the
perception of physical objects, the Phenomenologists were also
wont to claim that consciousness is aware of itself in a pre-
reflective and non-perspectival (or “absolute”) way (e.g., Zahavi,
1999; Sartre, 2004b). Even though one can take perspective on
one’s own consciousness in reflection, memory and imagination,
consciousness seems primitively self-aware without taking the
kind of perspective on itself that it takes on objects of perception.
It is not in need of a further consciousness taking a perspective
on it in order to be aware of itself (our Subjective Character
of the section “Phenomenological Invariants”). Moreover, it
is aware of itself in some way as a unified whole (cf., our
Multimodal Synchronic and Temporal Integration of the section
“Phenomenological Invariants”).
The PCM suggests the following account of these features.
First, the projective structure of the space of consciousness
includes, formally, what we can call a “global reciprocity”
property. This means that every point aimed at in the space
from the origin, as it were, automatically “aims back” at the
origin (without itself being an origin). This is not limited
to just a single point attended to. It characterizes the entire
phenomenal space no matter the degree of attention directed
to a particular point. In that sense, the whole phenomenal
space is experienced reciprocally and simultaneously from
every point that appears in the space (even though at each
instance one perspective dominates the framing). This is an
internal property of projective geometry and not to be found
in Euclidean geometry. It is manifest in a certain reversibility
that is inherent in all conscious perception. In the case of
seeing and hearing, the phenomenon is evident in what we
might call the “reversibility of here and there.” To see or hear
something as being “over there” is the same as the object’s
appearing “(to me) over here.” In being conscious of the
world, one is, so to speak, looking “back at” or “down upon”
(the directional spatial metaphor does not matter since it is
fully global) one’s consciousness of the world but from within
consciousness itself.25 There is thus a kind of reflexivity that is
not representational in the usual sense, built in to the intrinsic
structure of the conscious space. It is not a reduplication or
new meta-representation of consciousness in the manner of
usual higher-order theories or self-representationalism (see, e.g.,
Kriegel and Williford, 2006). It is perhaps better thought of
as a form of self-acquaintance rather than self-representation
(Williford, 2015).
25Note that this does not undermine the asymmetry between the point of view and
objects or qualities intended or represented in the conscious space (cf., Merker,
1997); these latter are, so to speak, transient inhabitants of the affine compartment
of the space. The global reciprocity property is invariant and subtends the whole
space. Thanks to Björn Merker and Christian Nimtz for discussions on this point.
There are two further important aspects of this global
reciprocity. First, when coupled with the set of transformations
that act on the projective space, global reciprocity grounds the
moment-by-moment perspective taking capacities implicated in
both working as well as deliberative perspectival imagination.
The reciprocity of its structure and the relevant group of
transformations together give to consciousness its horizon of
possibilities—the sense of a set of points of view it could realize
[something also well noted by Husserl (1982)].
The second point (cf., see the section “The Invariants
and Projective Geometry in the PCM” above) is that this
inherent sense of possible points of view is a major basis for
intersubjectivity and social self-consciousness. If there are other
possible points of view I can take, it is not too far a stretch for
one to identify these with the actual points of view of others [an
idea one can trace to Husserl and Edith Stein (see the discussion
in Smith, 2016)]. In effect, once I have a sense of my actual,
individual perspective vis-à-vis these other possible perspectives,
I can, with the right cues (facial expressions, eyes), take one
of these possible alternative points of view as being actually
occupied by another—as if the other were “slotted into” one of
my own possible points of view. If I did not experience the space
surrounding me as being a field of possible other points of view, I
could not experience it as being actually occupied by others with
points of view on me. There is little doubt that a major function
of consciousness and a factor in its evolution is that it allows
one to imagine (whether in a working or deliberate way) oneself
as seen from another point of view, friendly or unfriendly, as
a ground for social cognition. These considerations allow us to
unify the pre-reflective self-awareness built into consciousness as
global reciprocity with social self-awareness or intersubjectivity.
This relates aspects (ii) and (iv) above.26
Finally, there is the “ipseity” or “mineness” of consciousness
[aspect (v)], which is equally important for grounding
intersubjectivity, since one must be able to distinguish one’s
own point of view from those of others and not merely think of
others as extensions of oneself (see Zahavi, 2008 and many of the
papers in Summa et al., 2018). This is sometimes characterized
as the “de se constraint” on theories of self-consciousness (see
Frank, 2007, 2016). A conscious being implicitly knows that it
is the very being it is. This kind of fundamental acquaintance
with oneself and one’s own individuality is not a matter of simply
representing, via descriptions or some other mediated form of
content, an object that one just happens to be. Nor can it be
thought of as a matter of a conscious state bearing some sort of
external or contingent relation to itself (cf., Frank, 2007, 2016).
If it is relational at all, it must be a kind of “internal relation”,
something grounded in the very nature of consciousness
(Williford, 2015). We do not claim that the PCM, by itself, gives
us a full solution this problem. Nonetheless, we can make a few
remarks in this regard.
26Though we cannot expand on this here, we note that the global involutive
structure of a projective space may also contribute to the sense that consciousness
is aware of itself as unified whole. It may also help explain the sudden sense
of self-distance or scissiparity that occurs in hyper-reflective states, certain types
of mystical experiences, depersonalization and derealization (see, again, Rudrauf
et al., 2017). This would relate aspects (ii) and (iii) above.
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First, we do not have to accept haecceity views of primitive
self-consciousness.27 If we make “mineness” into a fundamental
property of consciousness as such and identify that with
subjective character, then we have embraced, on this point at least,
an essentially quasi-Leibnizian metaphysics of consciousness:
something analogous to irreducible monads with individual
essences. But subjective character is a generic property that all
conscious beings share. Moreover, there is no reason to think
that a conscious being’s complete set of intrinsic individuation
conditions (qua consciousness) is something accessible, even
though our individuality is indeed implicitly known and
reflectively available. We are individuals in some intuitive sense,
of course; but our sense of individuality can be parasitic on deeper
aspects of the physical world that determine our objective spatio-
temporal location and realization (see Williford, 2010, 2015). The
sense of being a distinct individual, to which we do have reflective
access, is, we think, ultimately derived from a deeper, inaccessible
level—our “roots” in the physical world (cf., McGinn, 1993). Our
lack of reflective access to these roots helps to give us an illusion
of completeness and individuative self-sufficiency, since we tend
to ignore or “fill in” all such blind spots.
We find ourselves as individuals thrown into the world and
beings for whom “our being is in question”; this is a reflection
of the fundamental individuating structures of the world and not
itself one of those structures except in the trivial sense that we
do indeed enjoy an awareness of our own individuality.28 If you
like, consciousness knows itself immediately as an individual (or
quasi-individual), but we cannot give a non-trivial, informative
ultimate account of how and why it is that individual, which is
as it should be, since ultimate individuation is either a matter
of brute fact or of opaque logico-mathematical necessitation—
neither of which makes much sense to us in this case, since neither
could be derived from something more basic and intuitively
obvious.
We might suggest then that among the roots of “essential
indexicality” (Perry, 1979) or the de se constraint are these:
the unrepresentability of a projective space (with its elusive
origin) in a Euclidean space, which prevents us from experiencing
ourselves as mere objects among others; the essential emptiness
and conceptual impenetrability of our sense of individuality
once it is stripped of all apparently contingent content (cf.,
Altobrando, 2018), which precludes reducing de se awareness
to the de re or de dicto representation of an object as having
properties (even haecceities); and our immediate, fundamental
self-acquaintance (cf., Kripke, 2011), without which there could
be no conceptually mediated de se awareness or representation
in the first place [and, arguably, no de re or de dicto
representation objects either (cf., Lewis, 1979; Chisholm, 1982)].
The first and last of these roots are directly implicated in
the PCM; the second is, at bottom, a perfectly general matter
having to do with the metaphysics and epistemology of
individuation.
27Arguably Husserl held such a view, see, e.g., Zahavi, 1999. Chisholm (1982) held
and then was convinced to abandon such a view by Dieter Henrich. Thanks to
Manfred Frank for discussions on this point.
28Thanks to Dan Zahavi and Miguel Sebastián for discussions on this point; they
will likely disagree (for different reasons).
Does the PCM tell us anything about how we know ourselves
in this immediate and non-representational way? The PCM
entails that any realized conscious system should appear to
itself in the reciprocal, non-conceptual way just described due
to its intrinsic geometrical structure. It is just the very nature
of this sort of structure; and there is no contradiction in
holding a property to be both structural and intrinsic. Sufficiently
interesting mathematical and computational systems can bear
internal relations to themselves. In mathematical logic, to take a
well known example, one finds purely abstract entities (certain
formal axiomatic systems) that are well defined individuals
and include, by their very structure, a sort of “window” into
themselves (a well defined set of representable functions within
the system that model the system itself and introduce a kind
of self-reference). This is one of Douglas Hofstadter’s important
insights vis-à-vis consciousness and computation (Hofstadter,
1979, 2007).29 As long as we are willing to imagine that a
consciousness is a physically realized computational system
that “models” itself just by its very structure, then we will
have an internal, intrinsic relation (call it “self-modeling”)
that holds between the system and itself of necessity and
invariantly.30 If we are realist enough about the concrete,
individualized implementation of computational structures in
physical substrates (whatever their exact nature), then there is no
barrier to being a realist about such a system. If we further identify
(a posteriori) the realization of such a system with the realization
of a phenomenal consciousness, then its “self-modeling” can, in
principle, be identified with its self-manifestation (phenomenal
self-acquaintance, minimal phenomenal selfhood), that is, the
phenomenal manifestation of itself in its individuality. This point
has an important application in the context of the PCM.
Ex hypothesi, the FoC as described in the PCM has a
phenomenal manifestation. Thus this type of self-awareness
structurally inherent in it has to be phenomenal as well, and
not a matter of conscious inference or reflection or speculation
or external relations one happens to bear to oneself: in being
phenomenally aware of anything, it is ipso facto phenomenally
aware of itself. All it will need then is a capacity for conceptual
reification and quantification to begin thinking of itself as an
individual with a history and a future, imbued with the functional
fictions of personal identity (cf., Sartre, 2004b; Metzinger,
2011)—the “ideal” self, personal responsibility, homo economicus,
the “neoliberal subject” etc.—with all the social structures built,
for better and worse, upon them. These considerations integrate
all of the aspects of self-awareness listed above (i–vii).
CONCLUSION
We might divide contemporary neuroscientific and psychological
theories of consciousness into three main types: Biofunctional
(e.g., Varela, 1979; Edelman, 1989, 1992; Damasio, 1999, 2012),
Cognitive-Neurofunctional (Baars, 1993, 1997; Dehaene, 2014),
29Cf., Varela, 1979, Metzinger, 2003, 2008, 2009, and Seth, 2014.
30This satisfies Strawson, 2015 quest for a kind of relation (other than identity) that
primitive self-consciousness could be.
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and Information Theoretic (Edelman and Tononi, 2000;
Edelman, 2004; Tononi, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012; Oizumi
et al., 2014). As should be clear, the PCM incorporates the
emphasis on self-awareness common to many approaches to
consciousness31 as well as an emphasis on the biological functions
of consciousness.
The PCM also incorporates the idea that global availability
is one of the crucial functional features of consciousness,
an idea common to Baars, Dehaene and others, if not the
singly feature. This is built into our conception of the
FoC, a virtual projective space in which various contents
become accessible for further multimodal processing. The
PCM gives a model of the computational substrate of
global availability: it must involve optimizing multimodal
information integration (via the FE principle), which
populates consciousness with determinate content, and it
must conform to a projective 3-space, which provides the
overall organization of those contents, a precondition of
availability.
We agree with Edelman and Tononi (2000) that information
integration is also important to consciousness, but the treatment
of information integration as formalized in the FE principle
combined with the concept of FoC in the PCM suggests
an important further articulation of the type of information
integration specific to consciousness.
The PCM thus subsumes and unifies the main insights in all
of these approaches to consciousness. Above all, what we add
to preexisting theories is a geometry: the thesis that projective
transformations and projective frames necessarily subtend the
appearance and workings of consciousness.
31 An emphasis on self-awareness (variously understood) can be found in
those neuroscientists, philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists
sympathetic with higher- and same-order representation and self-model theories
of consciousness (see, e.g., Hofstadter, 1979, 2007; Lycan, 1996; Damasio, 1999;
Carruthers, 2000, 2005; Flohr, 2000; Singer, 2000; Metzinger, 2003; Van Gulick,
2004; Rosenthal, 2005; Kriegel, 2009; Lau and Rosenthal, 2011; Gennaro, 2012;
Sebastián, 2012; Weisberg, 2014).
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